The Effects of the State’s Growing Control of the Media
[In the wake of Sunday night’s election results, a growing body of work has been examining the effects of the state’s growing control of the media. In early 2014, the Economist published a critical article on the growing power and influence of the state. In a recent article for Foreign Affairs, I document the effect of the state’s growing control over the media.
One week after Sunday’s election results, media figures and organizations are reporting on the impact of the “Arab Spring” – a term critics call the “Arab Winter.
The “Arab Spring” was a wave of popular rebellions that swept through North Africa, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa in 2011. They were a moment when the world became, from a few years’ reflection, aware of the state’s growing control over the media.
But not all media outlets in Egypt, Libya and other Arab countries followed their leaders’ lead. Most of the media that came out of the Arab Spring was owned by private-sector companies that did not depend for their existence on the state.
The state may have been the main owner of the media in Egypt, but it was not the only one.
In Lebanon, the state owns most of the privately owned media outlets, yet there are very few, if any, independent media organizations that are independent of the state.
Lebanon’s most well-known and most influential privately owned media outlet, LBC, came closest to the state’s influence, but it did not come out of it unscathed.
Suleiman Al-Khalidi, a journalist, was detained at Beirut Airport upon arrival.
A lawyer arrested at Beirut Airport, a citizen held in Israel, and a diplomat, were part of an ongoing international ‘Human Intelligence’ operation.
The human intelligence unit of Israel’s Shin Bet security service ‘researchers’ targeted Suleiman Al-Khalidi, a Lebanese citizen who was recently picked to be a special envoy in the Middle East. Al-Khalidi is also a journalist, and was hired by Israel and Egypt to investigate Egyptian involvement in the Syrian conflict, and specifically alleged Israeli links to former president Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian leader who was ousted by the military coup in Egypt.
He was arrested upon their arrival into Beirut and transported to Israel where he is held at the Gush Katif Prison. His passport was taken, as was his telephone number, a telephone which he has not been allowed to use. Following a request made to the Israeli authorities, his telephone number was obtained from a person who believes he is a friend, who claimed to be in Syria talking to the Syrian government.
Al-Khalidi was taken into custody in the presence of three Shin Bet’s agents of security services which detained him on the basis of probable cause. He was questioned on the phone with a Shin Bet agent on Wednesday, and was asked numerous questions, which the Shin Bet’s agents said were made on the basis of ‘intelligence’. The agent’s alleged responses are not reported to the press.
Al-Khalidi has worked as an English teacher for the Lebanese army and has published articles in local papers, and has also been interviewed by the BBC. However, he was not a Lebanese citizen and all the documentation which would establish his nationality is missing. Furthermore, the Lebanese government has refused to respond to this claim as it is based on unverified information.
The investigation into the source of the information which led to al-Khalidi’s arrest is currently ongoing.
The interrogations of Al-Khalidi and the other two persons are also continuing. Since he has been arrested at Lebanon’s international airport, Israeli authorities have requested that his name be released to assist in his possible re-entry into Lebanon.
Reports to the Reuters Investigative Team of Suleiman Al-Khalidi
In an article published on August 2, 2008, the Reuters (France) Investigative Team has reported that the Saudi royal court, through the authority of the Saudi government, has placed a ban on personal communication, that is, email. The article was based on the findings of computer security experts. This article will address the fact that many of the experts interviewed have been arrested as part of the investigations.
I was present during the beginning of the investigation and am a member of the company responsible for the network used by the Saudi Royal Court to send and receive information to and from the Saudi government. We have made several investigations into this network and have concluded today that it is operated with an extremely high degree of sophistication.
At the time of the interviews, we have been unable to determine if the network was used to send, receive, or store data for the Saudi royal court. I have spoken with several of the computer security experts who have spoken at various points in the course of our investigations. On the basis of the findings, we cannot be certain of the identity of those responsible for conducting this network.
We are now in the process of interviewing all of the key parties to a conversation conducted by one of the Saudi officials between 2003 and 2005 and have concluded that some of them were in a position to communicate with the Saudi government.
The Saudi investigation was launched on July 23, 2008. The first step was the arrest of Ali Al-Baz, the second deputy minister, who was identified as the leader of the network through the testimony of three computer security experts and was then detained and is presently being interrogated in the Central Court of Justice of Riyadh Arabia. He has been charged with organizing a network that operates with high levels of sophistication.
The following are the findings of the computer security people. All of you are free to read the articles and comment on the findings of your own.
The National Security Agency of the US did not monitor “Saudi networks” – but the United States is a major participant in this network.
Reply to Al-Khalidi’s letter to the general directorate of security.
‘Reply to Al-Khalidi’s letter to the general directorate of security’, by John P.
In the first section of the letter, Al-Khalidi and K. Reiter argue that, because the C. has the ability to detect a denial of service attack, it has the right to take measures to stop any of these attacks. This is of course an erroneous view of the law. ’s authority stems from the fact that it is a department of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that is an agency of the United States and that can exercise its prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, it is within the scope of the bureau to act independently and in accordance with the law and not in conformity with the bureau’s orders.
Because the C. has the power to halt the potential attacks on the Internet, it can do so in any way that is within its capabilities. The bureau has the ability to use any of its techniques for that purpose. For example, the bureau could order the site to be down, using the techniques of denial of service, and so on. Reiter’s arguments therefore show that the C. is acting outside the scope of its mandate because it is acting outside its authority and it is therefore acting “unlawfully and without legal authority. ” The bureau is, therefore, violating the law and thus violating both the Constitution and the Administrative Procedures Act.
Al-Khalidi and K.
Tips of the Day in Computer Security
This week’s tips of the day are based on what I have read in various recent news stories.
Most of the new devices (like routers) now on the market are based on the 802. 11 wireless networking protocol rather than the more common 802. 3 networking protocol. This means that the newer devices can use the more secure 802. 11 protocol without the risk of a potential vulnerability in the older protocol.
The latest version of Windows (Windows 7 or later) comes with a default WPA network security (802. 1x) option, which is still not the security most users will require. I use wireless for my wireless network. I also use IPsec to encrypt my connections. If you do use WPA to create your wireless network, then you might want to consider the following suggestions.
Change the default security strength to WPA2-PSK. The WPA2-PSK is a password that contains a special character called a “p” in the last three characters of the password. The “p” is generally used to encrypt the password.